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Abstract: This short paper aims to find an empirical evidence that al Qaeda behaves as a 
contest organizer rewarding an indivisible prize – namely, official membership and economic 
rewards – to candidate extremists groups. Would-be terrorists must then compete with each 
other to prove their commitment and ability. Hence to maximize their own probability of 
winning the prize, each group (maximizes its effort) tries to make attacks at least equally 
destructive as the foregoing attacks. The testable implication is that: the number of victims 
must depend upon the number of victims of past attacks. Resulting evidence confirms the 
hypothesis. At the same time, results show that al Qaeda-style terrorist activity depends also 
upon grievance for poverty and socio-economic conditions.  
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1. Introduction 
Recent studies on terrorism emphasize the socio-economic determinant of terrorism. This 
recalls the classical economic concept of opportunity cost. That is, the higher are the gains of 
an individual from participating in an ordinary productive activity the less he ought to be 
likely to engaged in terrorist activities. Therefore, better socio-economic scenarios would 
reduce the likelihood of terrorism. Moreover, would-be terrorists would be also motivated by 
grievance because of lack of civil liberties and existence of autocratic governments. Krueger 
and Maleckova (2003) challenged this idea showing in a cross-country regression a negative 
relationship between GDP per capita and number of international terrorist events. is 
statistically insignificant and very weak. Li (2005) stresses the negative association between 
terrorism and democracy. Abadie (2006) shows that an increase in per capita GDP is 
associated with a reduction of terrorism, even if after controlling for other country 
characteristics national income is no longer associated with terrorism. Berrebi (2007) with a 
specific focus on suicide attacks in Israel shows that that both higher education and standard 
of living are positively associated with the incidence of suicide attacks. Freytag et al. (2008), 
present mixed results either confirming or contrasting the idea that terrorism is negatively 
associated with better socio-economic conditions.  
 In Caruso and Locatelli (2008) a novel interpretation of al Qaeda-style terrorist 
behaviour has been proposed. al Qaeda-style terrorist activity has been analysed in the light 
of contest theory. A contest is commonly defined as a game in which players compete for a 
prize by making irreversible outlays. In other words, contests are situations in which rational 
agents spend resources in order to win a prize. The characteristic feature of this interaction is 
that resources are spent irreversibly1. In this view, al Qaeda may be portrayed as a contest 
organizer providing an indivisible prize to the best terrorist group. Bin Laden and his fellows 
may start a competition among groups loosely related to the ‘core’ of the terrorist network. 
                                                 
1 Traditional contest models are formally grounded on Tullock (1980), and found seminal 
explanations in O’Keeffe, Viscusi, Zeckhauser (1984); Rosen (1986); Dixit (1987). Recent excellent 
contributions are Moldovanu and Sela (2001) and Moldovanu et al. (2007).  
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The prize could be assumed to be some sort of ideological blessing (being accepted as a full 
and honourable member of the organization) as well as economic reward2. Hence, these 
candidate cells compete with each other. Agents – namely the would-be terrorist groups – 
play à la Nash and maximize their efforts. A crucial point is represented by information. In 
particular, all the participants are privately informed about their abilities – in other words, 
each groups knows how much it can achieve, but is unaware of the others’ potential. This, in 
turn, creates a favourable condition for the contest designer, since all groups are forced to 
give their best and maximize their efforts. In a second sense, information can be seen as the 
process used by groups to signal their commitment and ability (and, conversely, as the way 
bin Laden monitors their actions). Crucial to the argument is that information is costless. 
When it comes to terrorist attacks, monitoring and information costs are close to zero: in fact, 
when a terrorist group bombs an embassy or a trade centre with dozens of casualties 
somewhere in the world, the event is extensively covered by international mass media3. As a 
result, the link between effort and rewards is quite direct: the greatest effort is supposed to 
guarantee the prize.  
 At this stage, a punctual distinction between contest and tournament has also to be 
made. A tournament is nothing but a multi-stage contest. A tournament can be either 
simultaneous or sequential. As expounded by Morgan and Vardy (2007), in a sequential 
tournament, it is the effectiveness of the first-movers effort that is revealed to the second 
mover, rather than the effort itself. That is, the second long jumper gets to observe the 
distance jumped by the first, but not the underlying effort that produced the jump. By 
contrast, in a sequential contest it is effort that is observable, while its ultimate effectiveness 
remains unobservable until the very end of the contest. Dixit (1987) points out that modelling 
difference between contests and tournaments has no sense when observation is costless. 
When observation is costly, however, this equivalence breaks down. Put differently, in the 
presence of costless information there is no difference between a contest and a tournament. 
Therefore, players could not save efforts and resources in different stages, they have to 
maximize efforts. Hereafter, given the costless information emerging after a terrorist attack, 
equivalence between contest and tournament can be assumed in our context.  
 
2. Testable Implications and empirical strategy.  
As noted earlier, in the presence of a tournament, each group observes the results of some 
previous attacks. Hence to maximize their own probability of winning the prize, each group 
(maximizes its effort) tries to make attacks at least equally destructive as the foregoing 
attacks. The testable implication is that: the number of victims depends upon the number of 
victims of past attacks.  In order to verify such hypothesis, it is possible to regress the number 
of victims of attack on the number of victims of the previous attack in the same country. That 
is, the implicit limiting assumption is that if a tournament takes shape, it does at a national 
level.  
 Because the dependent variable is event count, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates 
can be inefficient, inconsistent, and biased. The negative binomial regression is thus 
applied. In particular, the negative binomial regression has to be preferred because the data 
exhibit overdispersion. Data on terrorist incidents have been extracted from WITS 
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, National Counterterrorism center4. The dataset is very 
detailed. Each record reports different characteristics of the incident. Then, it had been 
                                                 
2 It is established that al Qaeda has given grants to local groups that devised promising plans for 
attacks.  
3 In a recent article Rohner and Frey demonstrated empirically that media attention and terrorism do 
mutually Granger cause each other. See Rohner and Frey (2007).  
4 The dataset is downloable at the address http://wits.nctc.gov/Export.do (last access september 2008).  
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possible to filter the dataset in order to in order to consider only incidents fitting with al 
Qaeda’s modus operandi. Therefore the records have been filtered according the following 
steps: 
 
(1) each record had to report the islamic extremist as perpetrator. In particular, the 
dataset collected three different types of Islamic extremism: (a) Sunni; (b) Shia; (c) 
unknown. Only (a) and (c) have been considered; 
(2) Incidents occurred in Israel, Gaza Strip, West Bank, Iraq and Afghanistan have been 
excluded; 
(3) Each incident had to involve explosive devices (in particular IED, Improvised 
explosive device); 
(4) Attacks to facilities have been excluded. For example, attacks to pipelines have been 
excluded; 
(5) Assassinations of political leaders have been excluded even if an involvement of 
islamist extremists has been reported;   
(6) Attacks to shops, groceries and small business facilities have been excluded; 
(7) Zero-victims incidents have been excluded.  
(8) Victims of coordinated attacks have been aggregated.  
 
Once the data has been filtered the total number of observations reduced to 201. Eventually, 
the sample estimation covers 22 countries5 over the period January 2004 – March 2008. For 
each record the total numbers of victims has been computed as the sum of deaths and injured. 
Data on GDP per capita have been extracted from the IMF World Economic Outlook. Data 
are derived by converting GDP in national currency to U.S. dollars and then dividing it by 
total population. Data for Somalia are missing. Hence it has not been included. The 
institutional regime has been captured through the polity index as developed in Polity IV 
project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2006. This index is bounded 
between -10 and 10 where 10 means perfect democracy.   
 It is widely acknowledged that the use of GDP (or alternatively GNP) as a measure of 
progress of nations is strongly criticised. In fact it can be misleading. First, GDP per capita 
may measure the aggregate economic activity and not the social well-being. Second, the GDP 
measures only the current economic activity but says little about future economic scenario. 
Therefore, in order to evaluate more accurately social well-being in a broader context 
different measures can be used. A better index is the Human Development Index (henceforth 
HDI for sake of brevity) produced by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
since 1990. The HDI combines three basic dimensions of human life: (1) life expectancy at 
birth; (2) education; (3) standard of living measured by GDP per capita. Given its nature, it is 
be considered a good approximation of a broader socio-economic environment. The life 
expectancy at birth is the expected length of life of new-born individuals given the current 
mortality rates. Of the three components education is calculated as a combination of (a) adult 
literacy rate; (b) enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education. By adult 
literacy, it is meant the proportion of the adult population (>15 yeas old) that are literate. Of 
course, education is a measure of human capital and it does constitute a stock. At the same 
time, it does also capture a future dimension of well-being. Data on Urban population 
(denoted by Urban) have been also extracted from UNDP. Data on military expenditures 
(denoted by Milex)  have been extracted from the SIPRI dataset and are expressed in constant 
                                                 
5 Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, France, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, UK, Uzbekistan, Yemen.  
 4
(2005) millions of US$. Table 1 summarises sources of data and descriptive statistics whereas 
empirical results are presented in table 2.  
 
TABLE 1- VARIABLES, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND SOURCES 
  Description Source Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Victims Victims of incidents (logged) NCTC 215 2.445 1.681 0 7.617 
PastVict 
Victims of previous incident in the same 
country (logged) NCTC 201 2.502 1.647 0 7.142 
Gdppc GDP per capita (logged), IMF, WEO 215 7.526 1.056 5.529 10.884
Polity 
Polity IV project index, bounded 
between -10 and 10. Polity IV Project 215 3.539 5.693 -10 10 
Education Education index UNDP 215 0.715 0.165 0.4 0.98 
HDI Human Development Index UNDP 215 0.698 0.099 0.41 0.95 
Milex Military expenditures, (logged) SIPRI 214 9.322 2.115 4.174 12.519
Urban % people living in urban areas UNDP 215 50.288 18.691 16 95 
                
 
 
TABLE 2. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG VICTIMS BY EVENT    
 (NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Pastvict 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.0475*** 0.0536** 0.0537** 0.051*** 0.054** 0.055** 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0284) (0.0279) (0.028) 
 [0.08] [0.09] [0.09] [0.06] [0.06] [0.07] [0.05] [0.05] 
Gdppc -0.156* -0.24* -0.2*       
 (0.05) (0.081) (0.0622)       
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]       
Polity  -0.008 -0.009  0.0004  -0.004   
  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.0083)  (0.008)   
  [0.399] [0.293]  [0.96]  [0.651]   
Urban  0.004        
  (0.005)        
  [0.46]        
Education  0.182 0.36       
  (0.450) (0.392)       
  [0.68] [0.359]       
HDI    -1.214* -1.219* -1.078**    
    (0.499) (0.5235) (0.502)    
    [0.01] [0.02] [0.03]    
Milex      -0.253 -0.04*** -0.04*** 
      (0.0222) (0.0215) (0.0215) 
      [0.256] [0.09] [0.09] 
          
Const 1.914 2.26* 2.023 1.58* 1.58* 1.73* 1.097* 1.082* 
 (0.397) (0.485) (0.388) (0.366) (0.374) (0.39) (0.227) (0.225) 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
          
Obs 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 
Log Likelihood -369.023 -367.0547 -368.407 -371.092 -371.091 -370.522 -372.66 -372.755 
LR – χ2 16.25 19.2 18.96 12.46 12.5 13.32 8.01 7.73 
                  
Notes: robust standard errors in parenthesis. p-values in square brackets. * significant at 1%. ** significant al 5%. 
***significant at 10%. Statistically significant coefficients are in bold. 
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Since the HDI index depends upon also upon GDP per capita, they have not been included in 
the same regressions. According to the same criterion, military expenditures and GDP have 
not been included in the same regression. In general, the econometric models perform better 
while using HDI instead of GDP per capita as proxy of socio-economic well-being. This 
indirectly confirms that GDP per capita as measure of well-being seems to be inadequate. 
Qualitative results remain unchanged.  
 First, the main hypothesis of this work is confirmed. The number of victims of 
terrorist incidents is associated with the number of victims of the previous incident in the 
same country. In specifications 4-8 the crucial variable Pastvict is significant at 5% whereas 
in columns (1-3) specifications is significant at 10%.  The results confirm that the number of 
victims of attacks is associated with the number of victims of the previous attack in the same 
country. In particular, it seems that the number of victims is increasing in the number of 
victims of the previous incident. Interpreting the coefficients, it ought to be maintained that 
an increase of 1 victim in the previous lead an increase of 5% of the number of victims in the 
following attack.  
 Second, a negative significant association between socio-economic environment and 
terrorist activity also emerges. In models (1-3) the association between GDP per capita and 
the number of victims is significantly negative. In models (4-6) the association between the 
Human development index and the dependent variable is also significantly negative. The idea 
that a root of terrorist activity depends also upon grievance for poverty and socio-economic 
seems to be confirmed. However, there is no significant association with institutional regime. 
In all specifications (1-8) the variable polity capturing the institutional regime is never 
statistically significant. This is not in line with prevailing literature which stressed the 
negative association between terrorism, civil liberties and democracy (see Li, 2005).  
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
The empirical results confirm the main hypothesis of this work, namely that the victims of  a 
terrorist attack depend upon the number of victims of past attacks. This seems to be confirms 
that would-be terrorist groups behave as they were in a tournament. They observe the results 
of past attacks and maximize their efforts in order to make attacks at least equally destructive 
as the foregoing attacks. What I would also claim is that the empirical analysis is based upon 
a selection of attacks which fit the Al Qaeda style and approach. This makes the analysis 
peculiar. That is, it cannot be compared with foregoing studies which did not disentangle 
behaviour of would-be Al Qaeda cells from the complex and heterogeneous  world of 
terrorism.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
ABADIE A., (2006), Poverty, Political Freedom and the Roots of Terrorism, The American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol.96, n.2, pp. 50-56.  
BERREBI, C., (2007), Evidence about the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism 
among Palestinians, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, vol. 13, n.1, , 
article 2, http://www.bepress.com/peps/vol13/iss1/2. 
CARUSO R., LOCATELLI A., (2008), Deadly Contests: An Economic Note on al Qaeda’s 
Reward System, The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, vol. 3, n. 2, pp. 62-67. 
DIXIT A., (1987), Strategic Behavior in Contests, The American Economic Review, vol. 77, n. 
5, pp. 891-898. 
 6
FREYTAG A., KRUGER J.J., SCHNEIDER F., (2008), The Orginis of Terrorism, Cross Country 
Estimates on socio economic determinants of terrorism, paper presented at the second 
NEAT workshop, Bruxelles, September 2008.  
KRUEGER A., MALECKOVA J,, (2003) Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal 
Connection?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 17, n. 4, pp. 119-144 
LI Q., (2005), Does Democracy Promote or reduce Transnational Terrorist incidents?, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, n.2, pp.278-297.  
MOLDOVANU B., SELA A., (2001) The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests, The 
American Economic Review, vol. 91, n. 3, pp. 542-558. 
MOLDOVANU B., SELA A., SHI X, (2007), Contests for Status, Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 115, n.2, pp. 338-363. 
MORGAN J., VARDY F., The Value of Commitment in contests and tournaments when 
observation is costly, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 60, n.2, pp. 326-338 
NTI K., (2004), Maximum Efforts in Contests with Asymmetric Valuations, European 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 20, pp. 1059-1066. 
NTI K., (1999), Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations, Public Choice, vol. 98, 1999, pp. 
415-430. 
O’KEEFFE M., VISCUSI K., ZECKHAUSER R., (1984), Economic Contests: Comparative 
Reward Schemes, Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 2, n. 1, pp. 27-56. 
ROHNER D., FREY B.S., (2007), Blood and Ink! The Common-interest-game between terrorist 
and the media, Public Choice, vol. 133, pp. 129-145. 
ROSEN S., (1986), Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments, The American 
Economic Review, vol. 76, n. 4, pp. 701-715. 
TULLOCK G., Efficient Rent Seeking, in J. Buchanan, R. Tollison, G. Tullock, (eds.), Toward 
a Theory of the Rent-seeking Society, College Station, TX, Texas A&M University Press, 
1980, pp. 97-112 
